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Come raccogliamo il materiale
La selezione dei lavori mantiene un equilibrio tra spessore accademico e rispettabilità, ma anche un’ampiezza di prospettive e interessi oltre l’ambito accademico. Abbiamo delineato dei criteri per il controllo della qualità e la selezione del materiale è stata basata sulle cinque sezioni qui di seguito.
questa sezione è dedicata alle attività dei principali autori delle minacce, e cioè Russia e Cina, e ai loro obiettivi, motivazioni e capacità.
questa sezione è dedicata ai metodi e agli strumenti impiegati dagli autori delle minacce per manipolare le informazioni: social media, storie, tecnologie emergenti, ecc.
questa sezione si occupa delle aree socio-politiche prese di mira dagli autori delle minacce: coesione sociale, prassi politiche, salute, sicurezza e politica estera.
questa sezione è incentrata sugli effetti della manipolazione delle informazioni e ingerenze da parte di attori stranieri (FIMI, foreign information manipulations and interference) in termini di esiti: impatti cognitivi, divisione sociale e politica, proiezione del potere di persuasione, ecc.
questa sezione classifica i tipi di risposte alla manipolazione delle informazioni e ingerenze da parte di attori stranieri (FIMI, foreign information manipulations and interference) da parte di una serie di soggetti interessati: risposte normative, proattive e di autoregolamentazione, reattive e raccomandazioni politiche.
Filtri
A report examining Ukraine’s strategies to counter Russian disinformation during the ongoing war, providing lessons and policy recommendations to effectively address false narratives and propaganda in future engagements.
A report analysing how the Chinese Communist Party has evolved to utilise social media platforms, employing generative AI and social bots for both overt propaganda and covert influence operations (with insights drawn from the career of PLA researcher Dr Li Bicheng)
A study on the effectiveness of Twitter’s labeling of “Russia state-affiliated media” accounts during the Russian-Ukrainian war, suggesting that such measures may have contributed to reducing the impact of these accounts’ tweets, thereby providing empirical evidence to guide reflection on content moderation policy
A study comparing Russia’s strategies in the Chechen wars and the current war in Ukraine, revealing patterns in its political, military and media approaches that suggest Russia views Ukraine not as a sovereign state, but as an extension of its own territory (ie, same playbook, different century)
An article on cybersecurity in the context of information warfare, examining the escalating threats posed by cyberattacks to personal data, critical infrastructure and global security, arguing for the importance of robust defense strategies, advanced methodologies and comprehensive analysis.
An article on US national security strategy, critiquing its reliance on unmeasurable influence operations, outdated advertising practices and the lack of coordinated application of advanced psychological science, operational design and measurement across government.
A study of how social media — enabled by internet infrastructure, targeted advertising and AI — facilitates the rapid and low-cost spread of extremist beliefs and calls to violence, illustrated through a hypothetical case study.
A study of Russian disinformation activity as part of the ongoing war in Ukraine identifying common features affecting social cohesion in Moldova and Poland.
An analysis of the information supply chain between Russian media and Telegram channels covering the war in Ukraine using machine-learning techniques that provides a framework for mapping dissemination pathways of influence operations.
A study of the European Union’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 examining the effectiveness of banning or geo-blocking Russian propaganda media in limiting the spread of such content among vulnerable fringe communities in Western Europe.
A study of Russian disinformation in the context of the Russian military’s attack on Mariupol (Ukraine) that combines concerns of war, gender, and disinformation.
An analysis of disinformation, propaganda, and interference as a form of “political warfare” targeting public conversations a in Norway and Romania in the context of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.
A study of the challenges faced by fact-checkers when dealing with war propaganda and how their socio-professional contexts influence these obstacles, which include time constraints, resource limitations, and the struggle to find reliable information (e.g. because of language barriers).
A report examining the terminology of Russian information warfare from the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in Ukraine until 2023 focusing on publications in prominent Russian military science journals.
An analysis of the role of large social media accounts as a form of governmental “outsourcing” in the spread of disinformation in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.