How to use OSINT tools to investigate identity-based disinformation/FIMI

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How to use OSINT tools to investigate identity-based disinformation/FIMI
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Foreign actors are exploiting sensitive topics such as multicultural integration, women’s emancipation, and LGBTIQ+ rights to portray them as immoral and somehow detrimental to ‘traditional values’ in order to create social fractures and advance their geopolitical agendas through identity-based disinformation (IBD).

IBD represents a sophisticated form of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) that weaponises identity characteristics – including gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and religion – to systematically undermine and silence marginalized communities. The EEAS has pioneered research into FIMI targeting LGBTIQ+ people. This guide expands on this research by revealing how identity manipulation serves as a strategic tool in broader geopolitical campaigns.

The European External Action Service (EEAS) has released a practical guide on how to use open source intelligence to detect and analyse identity based FIMI, including disinformation.

Five circles labeled: Who, What, When, Where, Why.

This comprehensive toolkit arrives at a crucial moment when progressive social changes are stifled by manipulative calls to protect non-descript, catch-all ‘traditional values’. The guide can equip analysts, civil society organizations, and potential victims with powerful Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) tools and methodologies to investigate these threats. By aggregating and analysing data from diverse public sources, users can uncover the full scope of IBD/FIMI campaigns, addressing crucial questions about perpetrators, techniques, timing, geographic scope, and strategic objectives.

The focus is on creating a practical approach, featuring a comprehensive collection of over 80 OSINT tools and repositories accessible to all users. These resources enable investigators to:

  • Identify and track the actors behind manipulation campaigns
  • Document manipulative techniques
  • Map the geographic spread and scale of incidents
  • Establish temporal correlations with specific events
  • Uncover the strategic objectives driving IBD operations

Flowchart with questions and assessment tools for disinformation.

The guide serves a dual purpose: it enhances the OSINT community’s capacity to recognize and investigates identity-based aspects of disinformation while providing victims of IBD-focused FIMI with concrete tools to detect and document attacks. This innovative approach strengthens collaboration within the defender community and builds resilience against future threats.

Built on rigorous methodological frameworks, the guide offers systematic approaches to analysing FIMI while emphasizing responsible investigative practices. It includes detailed instructions for conducting threat assessments of online ecosystems and navigating the complexities of modern disinformation campaigns.

For example, it shows what tools were used to archive a Telegram post involved in spreading a hoax about female Algerian boxer Imane Khelif’s gender during the Paris Olympics. The archived link can then be used for reference in further research.

The guide also provides recommendations to protect democratic integrity and strengthen global responses to IBD-driven FIMI. One of these is to also address the ethical and legal bounds within which OSINT investigations must operate and a call for researchers to reflect the diversity of the communities targeted by IBD.

Finally, the guide emphasizes the importance of establishing global standards for OSINT investigations. By contributing to achieving these standards it represents a significant step forward in countering the manipulation of identity for malicious purposes and fosters greater collaboration within the OSINT community.

Disclaimer

Cases in the EUvsDisinfo database focus on messages in the international information space that are identified as providing a partial, distorted, or false depiction of reality and spread key pro-Kremlin messages. This does not necessarily imply, however, that a given outlet is linked to the Kremlin or editorially pro-Kremlin, or that it has intentionally sought to disinform. EUvsDisinfo publications do not represent an official EU position, as the information and opinions expressed are based on media reporting and analysis of the East Stratcom Task Force.

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